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Abstract
This paper examines the short—run relation between anticipated in-
flation and the real rate of interest in a model where agents with perfect
foresight maximize utility over infinite lifetimes. In addi'tion to deriving
behavioral functions from explicit intertemporal optimization, the approach
taken here departs from the usual IS-LM analysis in that it is dynamic and
deals with a small economy open to trade in consumption goods. Because
capital mobility must be ruled out to allow scope for variation in the
real interest rate, the results obtained here for one of the two exchange—
rate regimes considered——free floating-—apply equally to a closed economy.
The paper shows that an increase in the expected inflation rate
depresses the real interest rate in the short run when the exchange rate is
instantaneously fixed by the central bank. When equilibrium is determinate
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Working in the context of Metzler1s (1951) IS—LM model, Mundell
(1963) established a short-run negative relationship between the expected
inflation rate and the real rate of interest. According to Mundell's
analysis, an increase in the expected inflation rate that left the
real interest rate unchanged would reduce desired real money holdings
and occasion an excess supply of goods through the wealth—spending channel.
Thus, only a decline in real interest, coupled with a rise in nominal
interest, could be consistent with simultaneous equilibrium in both
the goods and money markets.
This paper examines the validity of Mundell's prediction in a model
where agents with perfect foresight maximize utility over infinite
life-times. In addition to deriving behavioral functions from explicit
intertempora]. optimization, the approach taken here departs from Mundell's
in two respects. First, the model employed is dynamic and accounts for
both the impact and long-run effects of changes in inflation. Second, the
model describes a small economy open to trade in consumption goods.
Because capital mobility must be ruled out to allow scope for variation
in the real interest rate, the results obtained below for one of the
two exchange—rate regimes we consider -—freefloating --applyequally
to the closed—economy version of the model.
No model can admit the Mundell effect unless it also admits variation
in the relative price of physical assets and consumption goods. In this
paper, we adopt the extreme assumption that the sole physical asset is capital,
I am grateful for discussions with Guillermo Calvo. Financialsupport pro-
vided under National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-802308l isacknowledged with thanks.2
available to the economy in a fixed supply which may not be augmented
through investment. The floating and fixed exchange rate variants of
the model we study differ respectively from the models studied by
Brock (1975) and Calvo (1981) only in the introduction of non-depreciating,
non—reproducible capital. The extension does not remove the multiplicity of
convergent perfect-foresight equilibria that may exist in the floating—rate
model, even when consumption and real balances are normal goods, when the
marginal utility of consumption declines with real balances.1 This stands in
contrast to Fischer's (1979) result that in the Sidrauski (1967) one—sector
model with capital and accumulation, normality of both goods ensures a unique
convergent perfect-foresight equilibrium.
The paper shows that the Mundell effect is present when the exchange rate
is instantaneously fixed by the central bank. When equilibrium is determinate
in the floating-rate case, there is no Mundell effect. Only in the fixed—rate
case does the real return on productive non—money assets fall temporarily in
response to an increase in the expected inflation rate. In the alternative
case, in which the economy is effectively closed, increased inflation, if it
has a determinate effect, causes an immediate fall in desired real balances,
but leaves other real magnitudes unchanged.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the
typical household's maximization problem. Section 3 describes perfect-fore-
sight equilibrium under a floating exchange rate, showing that there are
plausible circumstances in which there exist convergent perfect—foresight
paths other than the stationary-state path. Section 4 assumes that the
exchange rate is instantaneously fixed, but is caused by the central
bak to depreciate according to a pre—announced schedule. In this
setting, an increase in the expected inflation rate is shown to lead
1
This type of non—uniqueness for economies lacking capital has been noted
in unpublished portions of Brock (1972) and Calvo (1981). Apparently, the
phenomenon is not widely appreciated.3
to a short—run decline in the real interest rate if the economy is
initially at rest. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. The Household's Problem
The model is one in which identical households maximize the
discounted sum of future instantaneous utilities over an infinite
planning horizon. There exists a single, composite consumption good
which is perishable and available in fixed supply. The representative
household's instantaneous utility is a strictly concave function
u(cm) of its consumption (ce) and real money holdings (rae),
defined as nominal money holdings (Mt) deflated by the domestic—currency
price of output The household's objective is to maximize the
functional
f u(c,m)e dt, (1)
where is a fixed subjective rate of discount. Both consumption
and real money services are normal goods. 2
Each household is endowed with a fixed income stream of y units of
output, and may hold its remaining wealth either as money or as a
non—depreciating, non—produced physical asset ("capital") yielding a
fixed return r per unit.There are k units of capital available to
the economy, and the price of capital in terms of the consumption
2Naturally, u,u >0.To exclude corner solutions, we assume that
u (c,m)=limu (c,m) =
c--Uc m-o m
3me non-money asset may also be thought of as land (as in Calvo (1979))
or as the foreign currency asset held in an economy with a two—tier
exchange-rate system (as in Cumby (1979)).4
good is denoted by q. We define the real rate of interest as
r+q
q
that is, as the sum of the rate of physical return on capital and the
expected rate of capital gain. The behavior of this variable is the
focus of the analysis below.
Given an initial level of real marketable wealthw0, the household
maximizes (1) subject to the stock constraint relating marketable
wealth (wt) to holdings of the two assets and the flow constraint linking
changes in w to saving. The stock constraint is written as
w =m
+ (2)
where k denotes the number of units of the non—money asset held by
the household at time t, and the expected price of one such unit
in terms of consumption. The flow constraint has the form
=y+ rk ++ qk + (l/P)M -c,
(3)
where Tt denotes expected real transfer payments from the government.
The fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of (3) sum to expected
real capital gains on the household's financial assets.4
The maximum principle provides necessary conditions for the
maxmization of (1) subject to (2) and (3) .First,an optimal program
must choose mr and k so as to maximize the current-value Hamiltonian
4constraint (3) is consistent with the two-tier exchange marketinterpretation
of the model, since interest earnings on foreign—currency assets are current
payments typically repatriated at the corranercial exchange rate.








In (4), is thecostatevariable, interpreted as the shadow price of
saving in utility terms, and is a Lagrange multiplier. Second, the
costate variable must evolve according to the law
tt__ o)_P (5)
wt
The first-order conditions for an interior maximum of (4) are
u—)=O, (6)
(7)
X(r +q)—= 0. (8)
(Time subscripts are, for convenience, omitted.) Together, (6) and (7)
imply the usual equality between the marginal rate of substitution
u /u and the nominal interest rate, m c
U/U =(r+q)/q+P/P. (9)
Combining (5) and (8),wefind that
A/A =6-Cr+q)/q. (10)
Along an optimal path, the subjective rate of time preference, 6, must
atall times equal the sum of thereal interest rate and thepercentage
increase in the utility shadow price of realwealth.6
3. Perfect—Foresight Equilibrium with a Floating Exchange Rate
The conditions derived in the previous section describe how households
must choose their consumption and asset demands at each instant, given
w0 and expected future paths for government transfers, the price level,
and the real price of the non—money asset. They do not ensure optimality
from the household's standpoint, however, for the initial shadow price of
wealth, X, must be correctly chosen. In this section we assume a
freely floating exchange rate, and derive the set of perfect-foresight paths
for rn and which satisfy both the necessary conditions of optimality
and the consistency requirement that the expected and realized values
of variables coincide. Associated with each such path is an implied
value of which may be "wrong' from the household's standpoint, leading
to a suboptimal lifetime program given expectations. We therefore focus
on paths converging to a stationary state, which are necessarily equilibrium
paths. A key finding of this section is that there are plausible
circumstances under which there exists aContinuumof convergent paths, so
that equilibrium prices are indeterminate. When this is not the case and
equilibrium prices are determinate, there is no Nundell effect: inflation
does not influence the real interest rate.
To derive the system of possible equilibrium paths, some assumptions
aboutthegovernment's behavior are necessary. We assume that
government expenditure consists exclusively of transfer payments to the
public, and that these are financed entirely by domestic credit -
creation.The level of transfers is varied so as to maintain a
constant (positive) rate of nominal money-supply growth, i. The
implied government budget constraint iS:7
= (11)
Taking the number of households to be 1, we define perfect-foresight
equilibrium as follows. Let be a differentiable path for the
price level and {}adifferentiable path for the price of the non—money
asset. Suppose that the household takes as given the paths
and {}= pePtMO/Pt},and, given initial real wealth MQ/PQ +q0k,
picks paths {C} {rnt} and that maximize (1) subject to (2) and
(3). Then and are perfect-foresight equilibrium paths if and
only if for all t > 0,
cy+rk (12)
rn =Mt/Pt. (13)
Condition (12) must hold in equilibrium because the balance of trade is
necessarily zero when there is no capital mobility and the exchange rate
floats. Thus, the economy is effectively closed from a macroeconomic
standpoint. A consequence of (13) is that in perfect-foresight equilibrium,
the path {kt} must satisfy
k=k (14)
at each instant.
Differentiating (13), we obtain the relationship
rn/rn =31— P/P (15)
linking desired real balances and the equilibrium price level. Combining
(15) with (9) and (12) yields8
m =[p+(r+q)/q-x(y+rk,m)Jm, x(c,m) B u (c,m)/u (c,m). (16)
By (12), c =0in equilibrium, and so, by differentiating (6) and
equating the result to (8), we obtain
-1 mu (y+rk,m)




Assuming fl1, we may solve (16) and (17) for m and q to find the
reduced—form equations of motion
=[p+6-x(y+rk,m)Jm
(18) l+n
q =-- + 6-x(y+rk,m))]q. (19)
Together, (18) and (19) characterize the collection of possible
equilibrium paths for the economy.
The system described by (18) and (19) possesses a unique stationary
6
state (m,q), defined by the conditions
u(y+rk,rn)/u(y+rk,m) =p+6, (20)
q =r/6. (21)
Thus, in long—run equilibrium, the rate of return on capital must
equal the subjective rate of time preference, while the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and real money services must equal
the long-run opportunitycostof holding money. Anypathconverging to
6t3niqueness of the stationary state is aconsequence of the assumed normality
of real money services.9
this stationary position is an equilibrium path, for in addition to
satisfying the necessary conditions of optirnality, it satisfies the
transversality conditions
— (St
urn [in + q k JAe =0, t-ttt t














—arethe characteristic roots of (22),
l+n
[w1. w2J is an eigenvector belonging to 0. (i =1,2),and and are
arbitrary constants. As x =(Uu-uu )/u2 < 0 because real m Cnimrncm C
SeeArrow and Kurz (1970)
These ensure that the choices of consumption and real balances prevailing
along a convergent path are optimal choices from the household's standpoint.
To examine the local uniqueness of equilibrium, we linearize the





















When 02 > 0, there is a unique "rational expectations" equilibrium
path, namely, the stationary-state path m =m, =qobtained by




unanticipated rise in the trend inflation rate i causes the price level to
jump immediately to its higher long—run value, but has no effect
on the real interest rate, which remains at r/q =5.Thus, there is no
Mundell effect when the exchange rate floats and equilibrium is unique.
Equilibrium will not be locally unique if 02 < 0, however, for when
this is so, any choice of the arbitrary constant k2 yields a convergent
solution to (22). Figure 1 displays the phase portrait of (22) when
02 < 0. As m and q are both free to jump in response to unanticipated
events, they may, at time t =0,assume any value along the locus SS
in Figure 1. Each choice of initial position corresponds to a different
perfect-foresight equilibrium path. Thus, the effects of disturbances
are entirely indeterminate.
Brock (1975) has shown how multiple steady states may arise in
a model similar to the present one when real balances are inferior over
some ranges of income.Our example, however, shows that multiple e-
quilibria may arise even though real balances are everywhere normal, so that
there is a unique stationary position. For example, suppose the utility
function is a member of the homothetic relative risk aversion family
he economy an attain this equilibrium because there are no predetermined
variables. We ignore the possibility that there are non—convergent perfect-
foresight equilibrium paths.11
u(c,m) =(cR/(l_R),
where a + < 1 and R, a, > 0. Then fl =(l-R)and rational-expecta-
tions equilibrium will fail to be unique whnever R > (1 + B)/.
The possibility of multiple equilibria in the present example is
disturbing, for there are no obvious pathologies (as intheexample of
Blanchard (1979), where the income effect of changes in inflation domi-
nates the substitution effect) and agents live forever.9 The problem
is not a consequence of the presence of capital (ourexample "works" in the
special case k =0)..Indeed, when capital is introduced in the manner of
Sidrauski (1967), so that the relative price of capital is fixedat 1 by
technological assumption, normality of both goods is sufficient topreclude
the existence of multiple convergent equilibria (see Fischer(1979)). In an
open economy facing a known path of foreign prices, the monetary authority
can tie down the home price level by instantaneously pegging theexchange
rate. This, as we shall see, removes the possiblility ofmultiple equilibria
in the present model.
4. Equilibrium and the Mundell Effect with a PeggedExchange Rate
The home country's central bank is now assumed to fix theexchange rate
at each moment by accommodating any balance—of-paymentsdisequilibrium through
sales or purchases of non-interest-bearing foreign reserves.Because the
central bank stands ready to exchange foreign for domesticmoney on given terms,
the domestic price Pt of the consumption good equalsEtP, where Et is the
exchange rate (the price of foreign money in terms of domestic money) andP is
the foreign—currency price of consumption. Wesuppose that the exchange rate is
pegged at each instant, but allowed to crawl upward at the pre—announced,
constant rate 71.On the assumption that P is fixed for all t,
9
It is the finiteness of agents' lifetimes that is behind thenon-uniqueness
examples discussed by Calvo (1978).12
it =P/P.the (positive) domestic inflation rate. Government expenditure
again consists entirely of transfer payments, determined now by the formula
= (24)
While (24) implies that government transfers compensate the public for
the real depreciation of its money holdings, the rate of nominal money growth
10 will not equal T out of steady state.
Under the present institutional assumptions, the future path of the
price level is exogenously determined by the central bank, and the stock
of real balances is thus a predetermined variable that can change only over
time. The asset price is perfectly flexible, however, and paths
and Tt} define a perfect-foresight equilibrium if they induce
choices {c} and rnt} such that for all t
M - 0 t - = — + Ey+rk —c3]ds, (25)
T urnt t
Condition (14) must again obtain in equilibrium.
Differentiation of the equilibrium condition (25) leads to the
differential equation
xt=y+ri—c (26)
linking the equilibrium balance—of-payments surplus to the difference
between national income and equilibrium absorption. Since P/P =ii,(9)
may be written in the form
10Note that =
uMt
+'wheref is the real value of official foreign
reserves at time t.13
q =Ix(c,m)-- r/qjq. (27)
Differentiating (6) and combining the result with (10) yields
c =—i-- {u{5-Cr+ q)/q] -Urn}.
The foregoing expression, when combined with (26) and (27), gives the ina1
equation of the system,
1 —
c=— {u[5 + r —x(c,m)]—u[y + rk —c]}. (28) U c cm cc
The stationary state (c,xn,q) of the system described by equations
(26)-(28) is uniquely defined by (21) and
C =y+rk,
um(c,rn)/uc(c,rn) =71+5.
Inparticular, q remains independent of the inflation rate. The
transversality conditions cited above again ensure that any trajectory
converging to the stationary state describes an equilibrium path. We
now show that equilibrium is locally unique, in the sense that for any
initial level of real balances m0 sufficiently close to in, there are unique
values of consumption c0 and the price of capital q0 placing the economy
on a convergent path. Thus, when the monetary authority pegs the exchange
rate, the non-uniqueness problem that exists under a freely floating rate
disappears.








A general solution takes the form
C
C
U11 U12 U13 k1exp(31t)
—m
U21 U23 k2exp(92t) (29)
—q U31 U32 U33 k3exp(33t)
where the notation is the same as in the previous section. It is
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The sign pattern implies that the rational-expectations equilibrium of the
economy described by (29) is unique. Given an initial value m0 of the
predetermined variable, the solution obtained from (30) by setting k1k2 =0
and =(m
-
rn)/w23is the unique convergent solution of (29)
satisfying the initial condition on real balances. It follows that the
initial values of consumption and the price of capital are unambiguously
determined.
With the local uniquenss of equilibrium established, it makes sense
to ask whether an unanticipated, permanent increase in the inflation rate
iileadsto a short-run decline in the real rate of interest if the economy
is initially at rest. To answer this question, we must look more closely at15
the unique saddlepath converging to the economy's long-run equilibrium.









alongthe convergent saddlepath. From (29) (or directly, from
(26)), W23i'U13_i/03
>0,and so consumption and real balances must
rise or fall simultaneously along the saddlepath.
As in Calvo (1981), a rise in ir occasions a fall in long-run real
balances; and because consumption and real balances fall together along
the saddlepath, consumption must rise in the short run (if the economy
is initially at a stationary position) so that it may eventually return
to its inflation—invariant long-run level, y +rk.The effect of
inflation on real interest clearly hinges on the sign of w33/w13. If
this ratio is positive, c and q must fall together on the transition
path following a rise in ii.Andif the economy is initially at long-run
equilibrium, q must rise on impact if it is to regain its long-run value
r/cS. The Nundell effect is verified in this case, for if q rises and q
falls in the short run, the real rate of interest, (r +q)/q,must fall.
We now establish the existence of a Mundell effect in the present model




Recalling that = - uu)/u2>0when consumption is a normal
good, it can be established, after some manipulation, that the right-hand
side of (31) has the same sign as
-( )2 (32) ccmm cm
But expression (32) is strictly positive because the utility function is
concave. It follows that 33l3 >0,implying that a permanent increase
in the expected inflation rate must depress the real rate of interest in
the short run.
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied the link between inflation and real interest
in a simple model based on individual utility maximization over time.
When the exchange—rate follows an exogenous path determined by the
central bank, so that the domestic price level and stock of real balances
are instantaneously rigid, an increase in expected inflation does depress
the real interest rate in the short run if the economy is initially at
rest. The fall in real interest, together with the concomitant rise
in consumption, maintains the necessary equality between the marginal utility
of money and the opportunity cost, in utility terms, of holding real balances.
When the exchange rate floats and the price level is accordingly
flexible, real balances drop immediately in response to increased
inflation, restoring portfolio balance with no change in consumption or
real interest. It may occur, however, that the model's equilibrium is
not uniquely determined in the flexible-price case. Surprisingly, non-uniqueness
can occur in quite unexceptional circumstances. It does not presuppose any17
of the pathological conditions typically invoked to generate economies
with multiple rational-expectations equilibria.
The paper has drawn heavily on work of Brock (1975) and Calvo (1981)
introducing into their monetary models an additional asset, non-depreciating,
non—reproducible capital. An obvious next step is to extend the present
work to a two—sector setting in which investment goods can be produced
while the price of capital in terms of consumption remains variable.18
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